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The Fifth Liberalization of Capital Movements
into Japan
Background
T o A gaikokujin (foreigner) intent on establishing an equity po-
sition in the economy of Japan, the Japanese must seem as some
oriental Janus; one side proclaiming the desirability of and its amen-
ability to increasing foreign equity participation in the Japanese
economy, with the other side, perhaps more quietly, emphasizing the
need to protect Japanese business interests from foreign competition
and control. These divergent views seem to reflect the traditional
guarded curiosity with which Japan has always confronted the out-
side world.
Allowing increased foreign investment is viewed as being ad-
vantageous to the Japanese economy because it will enhance the
status of Japan in the international community, encourage compe-
tition, and lead to greater economic growth and a higher standard
of living,1 through the securing of free access to international mar-
kets and sources of raw materials.2 On the other hand, there are
three basic fears in Japanese economic and industrial circles of
greater equity participation by foreigners. First, it is felt that in-
creased outside investment will result in control of the Japanese
economy by foreign capital because of more advanced foreign techni-
cal development and greater capital power. Second, is the fear that
Japanese technical development will be stifled because of the ten-
dency of foreign capital to concentrate on technical development
in its home country. Third, there is the fear that economic and so-
cial disorder will result if the greater economic power of the outside
investors spurs excessive competition in Japan.' In addition to these
intellectual objections, one must also realize the import of more emo-
tional stimuli. The so-called "black-ship" syndrome, stemming from
the visit of Commodore Perry and the unequal treaties of the Meiji
period, has resulted in a quiet hostility toward foreign contacts
which is carried over to foreign investment. While this feeling is
inherently contradictory with Japanese desires for a free interna-
l Y. Kanazawa, Accession of Japan to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation
and Development (OECD) and the Liberalization of Capital Movements, 11 JAPANESE
ANNUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 24, 35-36 (1967) (hereinafter, Kanazawa).
2 D. F. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN 242 (1973) (hereinafter,
HENDERSON).
3 Kanazawa, supra note 1, at 27.
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tional economy, it is nevertheless a real factor influencing the devel-
opment and conduct of Japanese policies toward the liberalization
of foreign investment in Japan.4
The duality of the Japanese attitude is readily apparent in the
cornerstone of Japanese foreign investment policy - the Law Con-
cerning Foreign Investment of 1950."
Article One of the Foreign Investment Law states that:
The purpose of this law is to create a sound basis for foreign
investment in Japan, by limiting the induction of foreign invest-
ment to that which will contribute to the self-support and sound
development of the Japanese economy and to the improvement of
the international balance of payments, by securing remittances
arising from foreign investment, and by providing for adequate
protection for such investments. (Emphasis added.)
Contrast this with Article Two which states that:
Foreign investment in Japan shall be permitted to be as free
as possible, and the system of validation pursuant to the provisions
of this Law shall be relaxed and eliminated gradually as the neces-
sity for such measures decreases.6 (Emphasis added.)
The protectionist aspect of the Foreign Investment Law clearly
governed Japanese attitudes and practices from its inception well
into the 1960's. 7 Japanese and foreigners, however, recognized such
a policy as "both meaningful and necessary if Japan was to rebuild
its shattered economy."'  They attribute to that policy Japan's suc-
cess "in overcoming the imbalance between the lack of resources,
capital and technology and an excessive population by fostering in-
dustries and promoting exports, and thereby realizing unprecedented
economic development in the 25 years following the war."9
With this revitalization of the Japanese economy, however, for-
eign criticism of the restrictive Japanese investment policy in-
creased,10 particularly from the United States." Another significant
4 HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 242.
5 Gaishi ni kansuru h6ritsu kankeish6rei (Law Concerning Foreign Investment)
(Law No. 163, 1950) (hereinafter, Foreign Investment Law) in 5 EIBUN-HOREI-SHA
LAw BULLETIN SERIES DA (hereinafter, EHS).
6 Id., Arts. 1 & 2, in 5 EHS DA 1.
7 ARTHURANDERSON & CO., TAX AND TRADE GUIDE - JAPAN 54 (1972).
8 Hartman, Japanese Foreign Investment Regulation: Semantics and Reality, 18
N.Y. Law Forum 355,359 (19,72) (hereinafter, Hartman).
9 Y. Ojimi, Status of Japanese Liberalization and Future Trends, in CURRENT
LEGAL AsPEcrs OF DOING BUSINESS IN THE FAR EAST 29 (R. Allison, ed. 1972).
10 ARTHUR ANDERSON & Co., TAX AND TRADE GUIDE - JAPAN 54 (1972).
11 See Hartman, supra note 8, at 362, n. 34, ascribing two reasons for this pressure
by the U.S., first, the penetration of Japanese companies into American markets, and
(Vol. 6: 279
THE FIFTH LIBERALIZATION
influence tempering the protectionist attitude was Japan's accession
to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) in 1964.12
Article Two of the Convention on the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development requires members to:
pursue . . . efforts to reduce or abolish obstacles to the exchange
of goods and services and current payments and maintain and ex-
tend the liberalisation of capital movements .... 13
A Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements (hereinafter,
Code) was established pursuant to the Convention. 4 The govern-
ment of Japan, in July 1963, while negotiating with the OECD for
membership, issued a Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and the
Government of Japan Concerning the Assumption by the Govern-
ment of Japan of the Obligations of Membership of the Organiza-
tion (hereinafter, Memorandum of Understanding). In this memo-
randum, the Japanese government expressed its
intention . . . that upon its accession of the Convention . . . Japan
will adhere to the . . . Code of Liberalization of Capital Move-
ments. [The memorandum further stated that the] Government
of Japan endorses the objectives of the [Code], has given careful
consideration to [its] provisions and is prepared to accept any ob-
ligations and commitments arising therefrom.'.
Several months after Japan's formal accession to the OECD
(about a year after release of the Memorandum of Understanding),
this Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements was amended.
Japan voiced numerous reservations to this amended Code. 6 In
fact, only two of the sixteen other OECD members raised more
reservations than Japan."
Notwithstanding these reservations, Japan's voluntary accession
to the OECD should be (and is) considered as constituting an en-
second, the 1953 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 4 U.S.T. 2063,
T.I.A.S. No. 2863, which called for free investment between the two countries.
12 See Kanazawa, supra note 1. Both "organization" and "liberalization" will be
spelled in accordance with normal American usage except where official documents or
direct quotations conflict.
13 Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 12
U.S.T. 1728, 1733, T.I.A.S. No. 4891 (1961).
14 Hartman, supra note 8, at 370.
15 Kanazawa, supra note 1, at 25-26.
l6 Id.
17 Hartman, supra note 8, at 370.
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dorsement of the concept of capital movement liberalization as a
desired economic goal. 8
1967-1973
In response to pressure by the OECD countries, particularly the
U.S., the Japanese government, in 1967, embarked upon a program
of liberalization." Under this program five rounds of liberalization
have taken place." While a survey of the scope and impact of the
first four liberalization measures is outside the intended purview of
this note, a brief examination of some of the highlights of liberali-
zation from 1967 to 1973 is in order.2
The entire history of liberalization during this period consists
of administrative (vice legislative) actions. No amendment of the
Foreign Investment Law has been considered necessary to implement
liberalization.2 2 This stems from the vast discretion which the For-
eign Investment Law, for its implementation, vests in the Cabinet,
the various concerned government ministries, and the Foreign In-
vestment Council2 ' (an advisory body to the Ministry of Finance).
That liberalization has been implemented in an administrative arena,
ostensibly as a matter of discretion, is significant because of the re-
sulting imprecision, possibility of change without notice, and lack
of formal appeal mechanisms. 4
The system for controlling foreign direct investment in Japan
evolved from the mandate of Article 11 of the Foreign Investment
Law which provided that:
A foreign investor desirous of acquiring stock or proprietary
interest in a juridical person established under the Japanese laws
and orders shall obtain validation of the acquisition concerned
from the competent Minister in accordance with the Ordinance of
the competent Ministry.25
18 Kanazawa, supra note 1, at 27.
19 Pearl, Liberalization of Capital in Japan - Part II, 13 Harv. L. Rev. 245, 247-
248 (1972) (hereinafter Pearl II); see also HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 237.
20 HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 237; see also Yojimi, supra note 9, at 31; Hartman,
supra note 8 at 363; and Pearl, Liberalization of Capital in Japan - Part 1, 13 Harv.
L. Rev. 59, 60 (1972) (hereinafter, Pearl 1).
21 For detailed examinations of these first four liberalizations see generally Pearl I,
supra note 20; Pearl II, supra note 19; Hartman, supra note 8; and HENDERSON, supra
note 2, chapter VII.
22 Hartman, supra note 8, at 361, 367; Pearl I, supra note 20, at 64.
23 See, e.g., Foreign Investment Law, art. 8, Standards of validation, designation,
etc., supra note 5, in 5 EHS DA 5.
24 Hartman, supra note 8, at 367-368.
25 Foreign Investment Law, art. 11, Validation of acquisition of stock or proprietary
interest, supra note 5, in 5 EHS DA 10.
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Note the discretion of the competent minister to prescribe require-
ments for validation. Formulation of these requirements is limited
only by the very broad standards set forth in Article 8 of the For-
eign Investment Law, to ascertain whether the proposed investment
is:
(1) Directly or indirectly contributing to the improvement of the
international balance of payments, or
(2) Directly or indirectly contributing to the development of es-
sential industries or public enterprises, or
(3) Necessary for continuation of existing technological assistance
contracts concerning essential industries or public enterprises or for
the alteration of the articles of the contracts concerned such as re-
newal.26
The meaning ascribed to these standards, and how they shall be im-
plemented is left up to the competent minister.
Article 8 also contains several standards which do provide some-
what more specific guidance to the competent minister in his formu-
lation of validation requirements. These, however, are completely
negative in thrust; e.g., the "competent Minister shall not validate
contracts . . . which fall under any one of the following para-
graphs. 27 (Emphasis added.) Nebulous as to what is per-
mitted, the Foreign Investment Law is a little (but only a little)
more specific as to what is forbidden.
The liberalization program, then, can really be viewed as a dis-
cretionary administrative relaxation 8 of discretionary administrative
standards, subject, of course, to discretionary administrative inter-
pretation.
The essence of liberalization, as that term is understood in Japan,
is automatic approval, that is, validation of the proposed foreign in-
vestment by the competent minister without screening and approval
by the Foreign Investment Council.29 Generally speaking, the first
four liberalization measures provided for automatic validation of
foreign acquisitions of up to 50% of the capital3" of a new enter-
26 Id., art. 8, in 5 EHS DA 5.
271d.
28 ld., art. 2, calls for this gradual relaxation; in 5 EHS DA 1.
29The Fifth Capital Investment Liberalization Program, Fuji BANK BULLETIN,
Sept., 1973, at 178 (hereinafter, Bank Bulletin). See also HENDERSON, supra note 2,
at 243.
30 United States-Japan Trade Council, Report No. 27, May 2, 1973, at 1; Embassy
of Japan, Press Release: Japanese Government Announces Major Breakthrough in its
Efforts to Encourage Foreign Investment in Japan, April 27, 1973, at 2 (hereinafter,
Embassy Press Release).
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prise.31 Capital acquisitions of 100% were permitted in a few areas,
but as exceptions to the normal 50% rule.32 Each subsequent liber-
alization measure for the most part "consisted merely of adding
business lines to the hundred per cent and fifty per cent catego-
ries. ' 33 The Fourth Liberalization seemingly departed from this by
abolishing the 50% list, but this change was only cosmetic.3 4 The
100% list was retained and expanded somewhat 3 and a "negative
list" of those areas in which individual screening would be retained
was created.36  Any industry not specifically included on either the
100% list or the negative list was considered open to 50% foreign
capital investment without screening. 3T  (Appendix II, Table 3
graphically demonstrates the scope of each phase of liberalization.)
Liberalization, at least through 1971, can be characterized as hav-
ing been limited largely to fields considered unattractive or inac-
cessible to foreigners,38 because of the presence of an already-exist-
ing strong domestic oligopoly, or even to fields of no interest to
Japanese firms. Thus manufacture of sake was liberalized at 100%,
Japanese-style silk-spinning at 50%, and oatmeal and cornflakes
production at 100%. 9 In sharp contrast to Japanese government
pronouncements accompanying each previous phase of liberalization,
it is interesting to note the real extent of automatic validation (the
focal point of liberalization in Japan). During the first four years
of liberalization (1967-1971) only twenty-eight foreign businesses
were accorded automatic approval. In 1971 this figure was thirty-
five, and in 1972 seventy-five.40  It should further be remembered
that these foreign acquisitions were usually limited to 50% interests.
As mentioned above, the first four liberalization programs were
limited to foreign investment in new enterprises. Foreign partici-
pation in existing businesses was not included within the scope of
liberalization. Automatic approval of foreign acquisition of stock,
where the foreigner desired to participate in management was lim-
31 Pearl I, supra note 20, at 77; Hartman, supra note 8, at 364.
32 Bank Bulletin, supra note 29, at 178.
33 Hartman, supra note 8, at 365.
34 Pearl I, supra note 20, at 65.
35 Hartman, supra note 8, at 365.
36 Pearl I, supra note 20, at 65.
37 Hartman, supra note 8, at 365.
38 HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 233.
39 Pearl I, supra note 20, at 72. The author points out that consumption of these
latter two products in Japan is negligible.
40 HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 233.
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ited to the same extent as portfolio investment (i.e., acquisition only
for investment purposes with no desire to participate in manage-
ment); that is, total foreign participation was limited to less than
25o of the shares issued by any one Japanese company (15% in
certain restricted industries), with the further proviso that any
single foreign investor was limited to an acquisition of less than10 .41
Finally, along with liberalization, the Japanese government took
what can be described as "counterliberalization" measures (again
because of the inherent Japanese ambivalence toward foreign invest-
ment). A loophole in the Foreign Investment Law which excepted
certain stock acquisitions by foreigners from the screening require-
ments42 was partially plugged when the so-called "yen-based" com-
pany was abolished in 1963. 4' These were Japanese corporations es-
tablished by foreigners with domestic yen in which profits were not
permitted to be repatriated. This same loophole was further closed
in 1967 when purchases made with yen not acquired with foreign
currency were brought within the scope of the screening require-
ments.44
Counterliberalization also has encompassed advocacy of the use
of the Antimonopoly Law4" to enhance domestic market concentra-
tion of Japanese firms. Strict enforcement against foreigners of the
provisions concerning unfair trade practices of the Antimonopoly
Law has been espoused.4" There have also been suggestions that
the Japanese patent laws be used "to compel nonexclusive licensing
of a foreigner's Japanese patents," that the Commercial Code be
amended to forbid cumulative voting, and that corporate articles
restrict transfers to foreigners and forbid foreign directors.47
41 Bank Bulletin, supra note 29, at 178,181; see also Pearl 1, supra note 20, at
85-87.
42 Cabinet Order Concerning Exceptions, Etc., to Standards of Validation Based on
the Law Concerning Foreign Investment (Cabinet Order No. 221, 1952) in 5 EHS DM.
43 Pearl I, supra note 20, at 66.
44 HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 255,272.
45 Law Concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopoly and the Maintenance of
Fair Trade (Law No. 54, 1947) in 2 EHS KA.
40 HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 256-259. For detailed examinations of the Anti-
monopoly Law as it relates to foreign investment see Ariga, International Trade ofJapan and the Antimonopoly Act, 8 J. INT'L. LAW & ECON. 185 (1973); Hildebrand& Matsushita, Antimonopoly Law of Japan - Potential Consequences of International
Contract Violations Under Article 6, 6 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. LAW & POL. 215 (1973); and,Matsushita & Hildebrand, Antimonopoly Law of Japan - Relating to International
Business Transactions, 4 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L. L. 124 (1972).
47 HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 259-266.
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It appears then, that liberalization as practiced until May 1973
was by-and-large a system for restricting foreign direct investment,
especially from control of domestic enterprise. Needless to say, it
did not appease Japan's trading partners who were desirous of
greater equity participation in the Japanese economy.
The Fifth Liberalization
On October 20, 1972 the Government of Japan announced "that
it would adopt a new, more open foreign economic policy and that,
as one of its main features, liberalization of capital movements (into
Japan) would be vigorously pursued."48  In January of 1973 the
government requested that the Foreign Investment Council formu-
late "steps to be taken for the liberalization of inward direct invest-
ment . . ."" On April 25, 1973, the Foreign Investment Council
responded to the government inquiry and submitted its recommenda-
tions (Appendix I, infra) as to the course to be pursued toward
liberalization. ° These recommendations were embodied in a Cabi-
net Decision of April 27, 1973 which announced the Fifth Liberali-
zation. Effective May 1, 1973,51 the program reflected the strength-
ened Japanese domestic economy and international economic posi-
tion, as well as foreign pressure for greater compliance with the
OECD Code of Liberalization.52 The program appears to have com-
mitted Japan to allow 100% foreign equity participation in Japanese
enterprise. Unlike the previous liberalizations, this fifth measure is
not limited to new ventures. It opens up existing enterprises to
foreign investment subject to the same conditions for automatic vali-
dation as are imposed for newly established enterprises.3
Detailed examination of the Fifth Liberalization shows that in
the case of foreign investment in new ventures nearly 900 industrial
sectors were opened up for 100% foreign participation. Twenty-
two sectors, while not immediately liberalized, were dealt with as
follows:
48 Embassy Press Release, supra note 30, at 1.
49 Recommendation of the Foreign Investment Council on Liberalization of Foreign
Investment in Japan, April 25, 1973, at 1, in Embassy Press Release, supra note 30, al
Attachment (hereinafter, Foreign Investment Council Recommendation). See Appen.
dix 1, infra, for text.
50 Embassy Press Release, supra note 30, at 1; Bank Bulletin, supra note 29, at 178
51 HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 259-266.
52 Foreign Investment Council Recommendation, supra note 49, at 1; Bank Bul
letin, supra note 29, at 178.
53 Embassy Press Release, supra note 30, at 2.
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- 17 categories, whose immediate liberalization was deemed dif-
ficult, will be liberalized on a deferred basis (Appendix II, Table
2).
- Five categories were completely exempted from liberaliza-
tion54 because of their sensitive nature and the grave and adverse
impact that the government felt would result from their liberali-
zation55 (Appendix II, Table 1).
With respect to foreign investment in existing Japanese enter-
prises, a course of automatic validation of 100% investments was
instated. While previous policy generally limited investment for
participation in management to the same extent as portfolio invest-
ment, the Ffth Liberalization provides that foreign investors may
acquire the stock of an existing firm only upon adoption of an affir-
mative resolution to that effect by the board of directors of that firm. 5
Making consent of the corporation to be acquired a pre-condition to
the applicability of the new liberalization rule was deemed necessary
to prevent forcible take-overs of Japanese firms by foreign in-
vestors."
The government's announcement also provides for the progres-
sive simplification of the confirmation procedures currently used in
the automatic validation process both as to new and existing enter-
prises."
Conclusion
As was noted earlier, the 1967-1971 liberalization program did
not result in true compliance with the OECD Code of Liberalization
by Japan. Whether the Fifth Liberalization in actuality results in
this compliance remains to be seen. The Fifth Liberalization does
mark a fundamental change in the heretofore existing government
policy concerning liberalization, by extending automatic approval to
situations of 100%c stock acquisitions by foreigners and by including
within the scope of automatic approval the acquisition of existing
enterprises. However, it should be pointed out that those categories
which remain restricted include fields in which foreign investors are
54 United States-Japan Trade Council, Report No. 27, May 2, 1973, at 1.
55 Embassy Press Release, supra note 30, at 3, which also announced that the possi-
bility of future liberalization in these restricted five industries would continue to be
explored.
5 6 Bank Bulletin, supra note 29, at 181.
57 Embassy Press Release, supra note 30, at 2. In the event that the needed consent
is not forthcoming, past regulations will be continued.
58 Foreign Investment Council Recommendation, supra note 49, at 4.
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extremely interested, such as the oil industry and retail trade opera-
tions. 9 Moreover, even the Japanese method of cataloguing these
restricted areas (Appendix II, Table 1) doesn't quite tell the whole
story. Category 1 (Primary Industry), for example, actually con-
tains 46 "industries" and category 2 (Mining) contains 67, accord-
ing to the standard Japanese method of industrial classification.6
Finally, it should be mentioned that no other advanced indus-
trial nation maintains a distinction between the acquisition of stock
in new as opposed to existing businesses. Therefore it would ap-
pear that the requirement that an existing enterprise consent to the
acquisition of its shares by an outsider violates the rules established
by the OECD pursuant to the Code of Liberalization.61
In the main, though, the Fifth Liberalization does appear to be
a genuine departure from past Japanese practices. The future pro-
gression of industries on the deferred list (Appendix II, Table 2)
to a fully-liberalized status, whether in fact steps are taken to liberal-
ize industries on the non-liberalized list (Appendix II, Table 1),
plus the streamlining of automatic validation procedures will pro-
vide the key to any future judgment of the sincerity of the Fifth
Liberalization. 2
JOHN E. CODREA
59Bank Bulletin, supra note 29, at 181.
60 HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 401.
61 Bank Bulletin, supra note 29, at 181.
62 Mr. Katsuhiro Fujiwara, an economic consultant to the United States-Japan
Trade Council, indicated in a conversation with the writer that liberalization in the
field of integrated circuits, scheduled for Dec. 1, 1974, should occur as planned.
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APPENDIX 1*
Recommendation of the Foreign Investment Council on
Liberalization of Foreign Investment in Japan
April 25, 1973
The Council, which received an inquiry from the Government on 18th
January, 1973, concerning the steps to be taken for the liberalization of in-
ward direct investment, has since then been engaged in studying the matter
and, having reached the conclusions set forth below, hereby submits its re-
port. It is recommended that the Government give due consideration to the
present report and promptly put into effect the necessary liberalization mea-
sures.
1. Basic View
It is already nine years since Japan undertook the obligations embodied
in "the code of liberalization of capital movements" of the organization for
economic cooperation and development (hereinafter referred to as the OECD
code) the principal objective of which is the complete liberalization of in-
ternational capital movements, and, although the four consecutive rounds of
liberalization measures have been introduced in the intervening period in
connection with inward direct investment many reservations to liberalizations
in this area are still in force.
On the other hand, in line with the marked improvement of Japan's eco-
nomic position in recent years, the role the Japanese economy plays in the
international economy has grown and the business activities abroad of Jap-
anese enterprises have been increasing.
In view of this situation, it is deemed necessary for Japan to demonstrate
to the world its determination and posture aiming at promoting in a most
positive manner the internationalization of its economy, on the belief that
this type of action will help avoid possible surge[s] of protectionism in the
world economy, and thus [prove] instrumental to the maintenance of world
peace and prosperity which depends on the spirit of international cooperation.
In pursuance of this purpose it is of urgent necessity that the Govern-
ment should now resolutely liberalize inward direct investment to the maxi-
mum extent Japan's present economic situation permits, and adopt the 100%
liberalization principle stipulated in the OECD code, departing from the
existing framework based primarily upon the so-called 50% principle. Also
by virtue of this action, the further development of the Japanese economy
is to be expected through freer international exchanges of capital and tech-
nology.
As to those restrictive measures which are deemed appropriate to be
maintained in the context of the present liberalization, it is necessary to sub-ject them to continuous reappraisal with a view to exploring [the] possibility
of liberalization taking into account progress to be made in creating an im-
proved structure and system, including legislative measures, and to promote
a further liberalization in this area. Flexible application of these restrictive
measures is, in the meantime, warranted.
Even after implementing the liberalization measures contained herein, it
* Source: Embassy of Japan Press Release, April 27, 1973.
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is, of course, possible for the Government to take necessary restrictive mea-
sures, should serious damages be incuired upon related industries, inter alia,
upon medium and small scale enterprises or agriculture, due to the establish-
ment of new companies or participation in the management of existing com-
panies by foreign capital. It also goes without saying that unfair business
practices on the part of foreign capital in Japan are not to be permitted.
However, all Japanese enterprises should reaffirm their determination to
achieve sound development by their own efforts under free and fair interna-
tional competition.
2. Content of Liberalization Measures
Liberalization measures connected with inward direct investment and in-
ward portfolio investment to be implemented are as follows:
(1) Approval of share acquisition by foreign investors provided
in Article 11 of the [L]aw [C]oncerning [F]oreign [I]nvestment
will be given automatically by the competent minister in accordance
with the OECD code, except in cases where
(a) It is not clear whether there is the consent of an existing
enterprise as to the acquisition of its shares by foreign inves-
tors - such cases [to] be dealt with as hitherto, or
(b) the acquisition of shares of an enterprise, either existing
or [newly created], which belongs to any of the industries
listed in Annex 1 [Appendix II, Table 1, herein], would re-
main to be treated as hitherto and the acquisition of shares of
an enterprise, whether existing or [newly created], which be-
long to any of the industries listed in Annex 2 [Appendix II,
Table 2, herein] would remain to be dealt with as hitherto up
to the date mentioned in the Annex.
(2) In giving the automatic approval mentioned in (1) above,
the confirmation and examination procedures currently in use will
be progressively simplified.
[Vol. 6: 279
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APPENDIX II
Table 1. Non-Liberalized Industries*
Industry Foreign Investment
(1) Agriculture, forestry and Subject to specific approval
fishery
(2) Mining Automatic approval of foreign partici-
pation up to 50% of capital
(3) Petroleum Subject to specific approval
(4) Leather and leather products Subject to specific approval
(5) Retail trade Subject to specific approval; automatic
approval of foreign participation up to
50% in retail chains with not more
than 11 stores
* Source: Fuji Bank Bulletin, September 1973
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